Matrimonial Property Regimes: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow by Hahlo, H. R.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 11, Number 3 (December 1973) Article 5
Matrimonial Property Regimes: Yesterday, Today
and Tomorrow
H. R. Hahlo
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Hahlo, H. R.. "Matrimonial Property Regimes: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 11.3 (1973) : 455-478.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol11/iss3/5
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES:
YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW
By H. R. HAHLO*
I Introduction
Some general observations by way of introduction may not be out of
place. First, the laws that govern the position of women in any given country
at any given time do not necessarily reflect the factual position. Until well
into the nineteenth century wives in all European countries were in law sub-
ject to the well-nigh absolute authority of their husbands and there were, no
doubt, husbands who exploited their legal superiority to the fullest. It is safe
to assume, however, that since early days most couples lived together very
much as they do today, and that, in the past as at present, authoritarian hus-
bands dominated submissive wives, while wives of strong character ruled
feeble husbands. Nor are women in office, trade or business a novel phe-
nomenon. During the Middle Ages women often administered the family
estates while their men-folk were away at war or at court. In the towns they
helped their husbands in the management of their businesses. Most European
countries allowed women to succeed to the throne - instances that come im-
mediately to mind are Elizabeth I of England, and Mary, Queen of Scots.
And what is perhaps even more significant, women were appointed to the
highest offices. Blanche of Castile (1188-1252), wife of Louis VIII, became
twice Regent for her son Louis IX. The German Emperor appointed Mar-
guerite of Austria in 1507 as Governor-General of the Netherlands; she was
succeeded in this high office by another woman, Mary of Hungary. The
slogan "women's liberation" may be new, but there were "liberated" women
in all ages.
Secondly, the practical importance of the matrimonial property regime
during the subsistence of a marriage should not be overestimated. To the
poor who have little of value to give, share in, or leave on death, it matters
but little whether they are married in community or separate as to property.
Nor does it matter very much to the well-to-do as long as their relationship
is harmonious. As regards "family assets", more especially, most couples
function as de facto partnerships and do not worry very much about what is
his or hers (with bathroom towels a notable exception). It is only when a
marriage collapses, is dissolved by death of one of the spouses, or one of the
spouses (usually the husband) becomes insolvent, that the matrimonial
regime becomes of importance. On the other hand, the governing regime may
in itself contribute to the success or failure of a marriage. High-spirited
women do not take readily to an order which reduces them to a state of legal
inferiority or makes them dependent for every cent on the generosity or
miserliness of their husbands.
* Director, Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University.
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Thirdly, it is trite but true that no matrimonial property system can
meet the circumstances of all people equally satisfactorily - the rich and the
poor, the young and the old, the first-time married and the veterans who have
passed through the fires of multiple divorces. The standard matrimonial
regime must be designed with the "average couple" in mind: a young man
and a young woman, starting out with hope and ambition but not, as a rule,
with much money. Couples who do not fit into this category must be given
an opportunity to cut their matrimonial cloth to their own measurements.
Fourthly and lastly, no description of a matrimonial property regime
can convey a true picture unless it is supplemented by an outline of the law
relating to the matrimonial home, duties of support (both during the mar-
riage and after its dissolution), and succession rights between spouses. As
long as she receives portion of her husband's estate, it makes little difference
to a widow (except, possibly, from the taxation point of view) whether she
receives it as her share in a common estate, an inheritance portion, or a lump
sum award under family provision (dependants' relief) legislation.
II Early Days
To speak of a matrimonial property regime among the early Germanic
peoples before, say, the Fifth Century A.D. would be a misnomer.1 On the
Continent, as in England, Scotland and Ireland, marriage in those remote
days was closely akin to the customary union of the indigenous tribes of
Africa before they came under the civilizing influences of European mis-
sionaries and settlers. Polygamy was permitted. The union was based on a
contract between two families, rather than on the consent of a man and a
woman. The bridegroom paid the father of the girl an agreed "bride price"
(pretium nuptiale, wed - hence "wedding"). In return the father of the
bride handed her over to him in solemn ceremony - traditio puellae.2 As a
result of the agreement, the husband acquired the guardianship (munt) over
his wife, who was the subject matter of the transaction rather than a party
to it.
Strictly speaking, the wife was not capable of property rights. It be-
came, however, customary for the husband to give her, in consideration of
her surrender to him, a substantial gift on the morning after the wedding
night - morgengawe or "gift of the morning". This was in accordance with
the principle of early law that every gift requires a counter-prestation.
Together with the jewellery and clothes which she had brought into the mar-
riage, the "gift of the morning" was regarded as the wife's separate property.
From the Sixth Century A.D., if not earlier, the general picture began
insensibly to change.3 When the Synod of Macon of 585 A.D., not without
opposition from some of the more conservative bishops attending, passed a
I On marriage in early Germanic law, H. R. Hahlo, South African Legal System
and Its Background (1969) at 345, 346.
2 The traditio puellae lives on in the modem wedding ceremony in the "giving-away"
of the bride.
3 On marriage during the Franlkish period, see H. R. Hahlo, supra, note I at 383-86.
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resolution officially recognizing that a woman is a human being with a soul
of her own, the legal and social emancipation of women was on its way. This
manifested itself in several respects in the law of marriage. No longer the
object of, but a party to the marriage, a girl could, at least in theory, no
longer be married against her will. The "bride price" changed character. It
no longer went to the girl's father or guardian, but became a marriage settle-
ment in her favour (wittum, dos) .4 Thus, she became a puella dotata from a
puella empta. Concurrently, she became capable of having an estate of her
own. It would normally consist of (i) whatever she had brought into the
marriage or acquired during the marriage from her family by gift or succes-
sion; (ii) whatever her husband had settled on her as morgengawe or dos.
Both were usually stipulated for by means of a carta doris, predecessor of the
modem marriage contract.
Failing adequate provision, a wife who survived her husband could claim
a legal dos (dos legitima) out of his estate. Thus under the Lex Ribuariau
a widow for whom no provision had been made by her husband by way of
dos could claim, in addition to any morgengawe that had been settled on her,
a legal dos of fifty solidi as well as a third share in the "acquests" of the
marriage.0 Among the Saxons and Anglo-Saxons, the widow had a legal claim
to a dos, for which a share in the acquests of the marriage was substituted on
birth of the first child.7 Acquests consisted of property acquired by onerous
title or as a result of the labour or industry of the spouses, and did not include
acquisitions by way of donation or inheritance.
During the subsistence of the marriage the husband administered his
wife's property and took its "fruits" (income) as her contribution to the
expenses of the household. The wife had to be represented in court by her
husband, and could not, without his assistance, enter into valid legal trans-
actions. He did not, however, become the owner of her property, which, in
consequence, could not be attached by his creditors.
All in all, the matrimonial property regime of the Franco-Germanic
period was a progressive system.
Little is known about the development of matrimonial property law be-
tween 900 and 1100 A.D. Our knowledge of legal developments during that
period is, generally speaking, somewhat fragmentary. When the train of legal
history emerged again from the tunnel of the "dark age", the matrimonial
property law systems of the Continent and England had parted ways.
4 The dos of the Frankish law is not the same as the Roman dos. The latter was
a dowry which the wife provided for the husband, the former a marriage settlement
which the husband effected in favour of his wife.
5 Ch. 37 (39).
6 The "third share", in one form or other, flits like a ghost through matrimonial
law. The wife's common law dower was a life interest in one-third of her husband's
land. And though there is no legal rule to this effect, one-third of the combined incomes
of both spouses has often been regarded as a fair measure of maintenance for a sepa-
rated wife.
7 Lex Saxonum, chs. 47 and 48.
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III Sketch of the Development of Matrimonial Property Law Prior
to World War II
(a) The Continent
Whereas the law of marriage, which fell under the jurisdiction of the
Church, was fairly uniform in Western Europe during the Middle Ages,
matrimonial property law, which fell under the jurisdiction of the secular
authorities, varied from country to country, district to district and town to
town. In some parts, the old Frankish system survived, under which the
estate of the wife remained her separate property but was administered by
the husband. In others, such as the South of France, the Roman dotal sys-
tem remained the standard system. In most regions, however, community
regimes prevailed, ranging from a community of movables and acquests, and
other partial community systems, to universal community of property and
profit and loss. How these community systems developed, is controversial.
Some historians believe that they grew out of the community of acquests of
Saxon law,8 others that it became such a universal practice in many parts
to establish community of some kind or other by marriage contract that
eventually community became an institution of the common law.
Everywhere the wife was subject to her husband's marital power. By
virtue of this power, he represented her in court, administered the joint estate
as well as her separate estate (if any), and had the right to administer
"moderate chastisement" to her. The husband's position as his wife's master
and guardian was justified on three grounds: first, that there must be a head
of the family and that, both on biblical authority9 and by the law of nature,
the husband is cast for that role; secondly, that, on account of the weakness
of their sex (fragilitas sexus), women require protection; and, thirdly, that
by partaking of the forbidden fruit Eve had caused the expulsion of mankind
from the Garden of Eden. "Adam was deceived by Eve, not Eve by Adam",
said the Corpus Juris Canonici.10
There were two exceptional cases in which a wife could, in most legal
systems, contract on her own. She could bind her husband's credit by con-
tracts for household necessaries, and if she carried on a public trade or pro-
fession in her own name, with her husband's express or tacit consent, she
could validly contract in connection with such trade or profession.
Where the husband is a good businessman, a community system has
distinct merit from the wife's point of view, in that it provides her with a
stake in his success. The opposite is true where the husband is a prodigal, a
crook, or just an inept administrator, for in this case he is likely to lose,
together with his own estate, whatever she owns. Separation of goods by
order of court was one of the devices that was developed to safeguard the
wife in this kind of situation. Unfortunately, as often as not, the damage was
done by the time the wife asked for the court's intervention.
8 See text, supra, at p. 5.
9 Corinthians 1.11.3, 8 and 9.
10 Decr. Grat., c.33, quaestio V, c.18.
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The instrument through which the legal position of married women on
the Continent was gradually improved was the marriage contract (in England,
the marriage settlement).1 At the instance of loving fathers, uncles and
grandparents, lawyers worked out marriage contracts which protected girls
from wealthy families against fortune-hunting husbands. Thus, in terms of a
"standard form" marriage contract, which was deservedly popular in Holland
diring the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the wife on dissolution of
the marriage had the option to share with her husband (or his heirs) in the
profits of the marriage or to reclaim intact whatever she had brought into the
marriage.12 Thus she was in a position where she could have her cake and
eat it, too. If her husband died rich, she would elect in favour of community.
And if he died poor, she would re-claim whatever she had brought into the
marriage. If the husband went bankrupt, the wife could exercise the option
during the marriage, and if she was the first to die the option could be
exercised by her heirs. In security of her claim, the wife had a tacit hypothec
over her husband's assets.
There was another device by which fathers could protect gifts and
testamentary benefits which they gave to their daughters against the greed
or mismanagement of husbands, present or future. They could expressly
stipulate in the deed or testament that the gift or bequest should be excluded
from the common estate and the husband's administration. Whether this
device was as effective as the English settlement in trust, may be doubted.
Still, it was a safety measure, which has survived in most civilian systems
to this day.
All the civilian systems adopted the Roman Law rule prohibiting dona-
tions between spouses. Its purpose was, not so much, as is frequently
thought, to protect the creditors of the spouses against fraudulent donations
(this can be achieved by other means), as to protect the spouses against
their own generosity. In every marriage, there is, in the words of an old say-
ing, one who loves and one who allows himself (or herself) to be loved. It
was feared that if donations between spouses were freely permitted, the more
loving (or otherwise weaker) spouse might end up by being a very much im-
poverished man or woman.
As regards intestate succession, civilian systems generally placed the
widow or widower at the bottom of the list of heirs, ranking only before the
State. Since most spouses were married in community, the surviving spouse
was assured of receiving a substantial portion of the estate of the first dying,
not by way of succession, but as his or her share in the joint estate. If intend-
ing spouses chose to exclude community by marriage contract, the wife, or
her family, would see to it that she was protected by marriage settlements or
succession clauses.
Community, universal or partial, remained the prevalent matrimonial
property regime in most Western European countries until well into the
11 See text, infra, at p. 17.
12 Cf. Quebec CC art. 1400.
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twentieth century. Universal community was the legal regime of, inter alia,
Roman-Dutch law, and was taken over from there by South African law,
where it has remained the legal regime to this day. (In practice the well-to-do
almost invariably exclude it by antenuptial contract.) It is also the legal
regime of the Nordic countries. Community of movables and acquests was
adopted as the standard system by the Code Napol6on and, following it, by
the Civil Code of Quebec.
The Napoleonic Code in its original form,13 provided that the wife (even
where the consorts were separate as to property), was to have no capacity
to give, alienate, hypothecate or acquire, by gratuitous or onerous title, with-
out her husband's consent in writing.14 An exception was made where she
was a public trader.'5 In legal proceedings she required her husband's author-
ity even for an action concerning her business or separate property.' 6
The legal regime, as previously stated, was one of community of mov-
ables and acquests.' 7 There were three estates: the common estate, the hus-
band's separate estate, and the wife's separate estate. All three were ad-
ministered by the husband, who was the 'chef of the family. He was not,
however, permitted to act in fraud of his wife or to make gifts of land or
movables of value to third parties. Although the wife herself could alienate,
burden or otherwise dispose of her separate goods, she required her hus-
band's authorization for the purpose.
On dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce the wife's separate
property was returned to her or her heirs, together with her share in the
common estate. By renouncing her rights in the community she could escape
liability for community debts.' 8
Like other civilian systems, French law allowed intending spouses to
vary or exclude the legal regime by marriage covenant, entered into before
the marriage. They could choose one of several ready-made systems, from
complete separation of goods to universal community of property, or adopt
a regime of their own design, always provided that the rules they laid down
for themselves were not contrary to good morals or public policy.'" The
doctrine of the immutability of the regime established at the time of marriage
applied.20
Donations between spouses during marriage were always revocable.
21
If one of the spouses died intestate the Code, in accordance with the civilian
Is See G. Baeteman in Comparative Law of Matrimonial Property, A.K.R. Kiralfy
(ed.) (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972) at 1, [thereafter cited as Kiralfyl.
14 CN (ancien) art. 217. See also arts. 218, 219.
15 CN (ancien) art, 220.
10 CN (ancien) art. 215.
17 CN (ancien) arts. 1400 et seq.
18 CN (ancien) arts. 1453 et seq.
19 CN (ancien) arts. 1387 et seq.
2 0 CN (ancien) art. 1395.
21 CN (ancien) art. 1096.
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tradition, treated the surviving consort in a rather miserly way. He or she
took no share in the estate of the first-dying spouse, if the latter left children,
parents or collaterals entitled to succeed.22 Nor was there provision for a
reserve or legitimate portion in favour of the surviving consort.
While the basic structure of the Code Napol6on remained unchanged
until the comprehensive reforms of 1965,2 a number of exceptions were
introduced during the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the
twentieth century to the rule that a married woman could not act without
her husband's authorization. Thus, she was empowered to open, deposit
moneys on, and make withdrawals from a savings account without his as-
sistance, and if she carried on a profession or trade, she could join a profes-
sional syndic or association without having to ask for his consent.2 4 Amend-
ments effected to article 767 of the French Code in 1891, and again in 1925
and 1930, gave the surviving spouse greater rights of succession ab intestato
in the estate of the first-dying spouse. If there were children of the marriage,
the survivor could claim a life usufruct in a quarter of the estate. Failing chil-
dren of the marriage, he or she was entitled to a life usufruct in part or all
of the estate, or to part or all of the corpus of the estate, depending upon
whether there were children of a previous marriage, "natural" children,
brothers or sisters (or their descendants by representation), or ascendants of
the deceased.25 And while there was no departure from the principle that the
surviving spouse is not entitled to a legitimate portion or reserve, under an
amendment effected to article 205 in 1891, a surviving spouse, who is in
need, is entitled to claim alimony out of the estate of the first-dying consort .2
The matrimonial regime of the Quebec Code of 1866 was designed on
the model of the Code Napol6on in its original form, but there were many
differences.27 Thus, where the first-dying spouse left no will, the surviving
consort was treated more generously than under the Code Napol6on. He or
she received a portion of the estate of the first-dying (and not only a usufruct
in it) even if the latter was survived by children or ascendants.2 8 In addition,
if the spouses were married under the statutory regime of community of
movables and acquests, the survivor had a usufruct in the property of the
community coming from the deceased spouse to the children of the marriage,
which lasted as to each child until he was of the age of 18 years or emanci-
pated.29 The 1891 amendments to article 205 of the Napol6onic Code, which
22 CN (ancien) art. 767.
2 3 See text, infra, at p. 25.
24 See the annotation to art. 217 in the 1935 edition of the Code Civil in Petite
Collection Dalloz.
2 5 CN art. 767, as amended.
2 6 CN art. 205, as amended.
27 On the matrimonial property system of the Quebec Code, see J.E.C. Brierley in
II Studies in Canadian Family Law, Mendes da Costa ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1972) at 819 [hereafter cited as Studies].
2 8 CC art. 614, later arts. 626a-c.
2D CC arts. 1323-1332, since repealed.
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empowered the courts to award maintenance out of the estate of the pre-
deceased spouse to a needy surviving spouse were not taken over.
The German BGB, which came into force on January 1, 1900, struck
out along new lines.30 Departing from the community idea, it established a
system of separation of goods, with common administration by the husband.81
Whatever the wife brought into the marriage or acquired thereafter otherwise
than by her own labour was her eingebrachtes Gut, which became subject to
her husband's administration and usufruct,3 2 but remained her separate prop-
erty and could not be attached by his creditors. Her reserved goods (Vor-
behaltsgut), which included, inter alia, things destined for her personal use,
such as clothing, jewellery and tools for employment and trade, as well as her
earnings from employment or business,a did not become subject to her
husband's administration. 4 As in French and Quebec law, the spouses could
regulate their property rights by marriage contract, but, unlike French and
Quebec law, German law permitted, subject to certain safeguards, variation by
postnuptial, as well as by antenuptial contract.3 5 As conventional regimes,
the BGB offered separation of goods, universal community, community of
acquests and community of movables.A6 The fact that very few couples choose
to contract out of the legal regime of the BGB is a tribute to the perceptive-
ness of its authors.8 7
If the first-dying spouse died intestate and there were children of the
marriage, the surviving spouse took one quarter of his or her estate. Com-
peting with parents or their descendants (brothers and sisters, or their
descendants by representation), the survivor took half, and, failing any of
the aforementioned, the lot.38
Half of the intestate portion constituted the legitimate portion (Pflicht-
teil), of which the surviving spouse could not normally be deprived. 9
Amendments made prior to the great reforms of the 1950's allowed the
wife to carry on a trade or profession without her husband's consent, and to
open and operate on her own savings account.
30 On the matrimonial property regime of the BGB, see E.D. Graue in Kiralfy at
115. While the French regime of community of movables and acquests was taken over
from the Coutume de Paris, the German legal regime was supposed to be in accordance
with Germanic tradition, see E.D. Graue, ibid.
81 BGB §1363.
32 BGB §1363.
33 BGB §1366, 1370.
34 BGB §1365, 1371.
-5 BGB §1432.
90 BGB §1414-1557.
37 On the present regime, see text, infra, at p.23.
.18 BGB §1931. See also §1932.
19 BGB §2303. For the grounds on which a widow or widower can be deprived of
the legitimate portion, see §2335.
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(b) England0
English matrimonial property law (England has never had a matrimonial
property regime in the Continental sense) had its roots in the law of Nor-
mandy, which differed in many respects from the laws of other parts of
France. The well-known tag that "husband and wife are one and that one is
the husband" 41 conveys a general idea of the position at common law.
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing,
protection and cover, she performs everything. 42
On marriage the wife's personal chattels, with the exception of clothing
and other personal articles, became her husband's property absolutely, to
descend on his death to his heirs. The seisin of any freehold lands owned by
the wife at the time of the marriage or acquired by her during the marriage
passed to the husband, who took their rents and profits. He could not, how-
ever, alienate them without her consent, supplied in a separate examination
by the levy of a fine. On his death, the seisin of the wife's lands reverted to
her or her heirs. The husband had the right to enjoy and dispose of his wife's
chattels real during coverture, but on his death those still in his possession
reverted to her. Choses in action vested in the husband if he reduced them
into possession during coverture.
Spouses could not contract with each other or sue each other in tort.
The husband was liable for his wife's antenuptial debts, as well as for any
torts she committed during coverture.
The wife had no contractual capacity but could enter, by virtue of
implied agency, into contracts for household necessaries. With her husband's
consent, she could dispose of her personalty by will, but even with his
consent she could not make a devise of her freehold lands.
If the husband died first, the wife had a life interest in one-third of his
freehold lands as "dower". Lands subject to dower could not be alienated
by the husband during coverture, unless the wife joined in the transfer. If the
wife died first, the husband had a life interest in the wife's lands, provided
issue had been born of the marriage - "tenancy by the curtesy".
The widow's rights of dower did not extend to her husband's chattels,
but from the twelfth century onward she was entitled to one-third of her
husband's personalty if there were children of the marriage, and to one-half
if there were none. By the end of the seventeenth century, the partes rationa-
biles had fallen into desuetude, leaving only dower and curtesy.
The harshness of the common law, in which the wife's personalty was
40 For an excellent summary of English matrimonial property law, see Vol. I,
"Property Subjects", of the Family Law Project of the Ontario Law Reform Commission
(so-calied "Baxter Report"). See also A.K.R. Kiralfy in Kiralfy at 180.
41 According to Theron G. Strong, Joseph M. Choate, New York, 1917, 22, it was
first used by Professor Loring.
42 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4th ed. (1771), bk. I, ch.
15 at 442.
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merged in that of her husband, was mitigated in equity, which permitted
settlements "for the separate use" of the wife, first on trustees, later on the
wife directly. The wife could dispose of property settled on her by act inter
vivos or mortis causa, and bind it by her contracts. By attaching a "restraint
on anticipation" to the settlement, the settlor could put it beyond the wife's
power to dispose by act inter vivos of future income, thus making it impos-
sible for her to anticipate or alienate such income for her husband's benefit.
Beginning in 1857 with the Married Women's Reversionary Interest
Act,48 and the first Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act,44 the restrictions on
the wife's capacity to own and dispose of property, and to contract with, or
sue her husband, were slowly removed. Milestones in this long drawn-out
process were the first Married Women's Property Act 1870,45 which provided
that a married woman's wages, earnings and deposits in a savings account
were to be deemed to be her own property, to do with as she pleased; the
Married Women's Property Act 1882,46 which rendered a married woman
capable of acquiring, holding and disposing by will or otherwise of any real or
personal property as her separate property in the same manner as if she were
a femme sole; and the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act
1935,-1 which gave full effect to the principle of separation of goods between
husband and wife. The Law Reform Act also prohibited the creation of new
restraints on anticipation.48 The last remnants of dower (rendered largely
ineffective by the Dower Act 183341 and curtesy were abolished by the Ad-
ministration of Estates Act 1925. 50
The Intestates Estates Act 1890,1 gave widows the right of intestate
succession in the estates of their husbands. It was superseded by section 46
of the Administration of Estates Act,52 which entitled a widow or widower,
whose spouse had died without leaving a will, to share in both the real and
personal property of the first-dying spouse.8 3 As there are no legal rights of
inheritance in English law, either spouse can disinherit the other by will. The
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938,r4 introduced family maintenance
provision on lines first laid down in New Zealand, allowing a widow or
widower, for whom no reasonable provision has been made in the will of the
first-dying spouse, to claim maintenance out of his or her estate as a
'dependant'.
43 (1857), 20 & 21 Viet., c.57.
44 (1857), 20 & 21 Viet, c.85.
45 (1870), 33 & 34 Viet., c.93.
40 (1882), 45 & 46 Viet., c.75.
47 (1935), 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30.
48The last existing restraints on anticipation were abolished in 1949. See text,
in ra, at p.2 7 .
49 (1833), 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c.105.
80 (1925), 15 Geo. 5, c.23.
51 (1890), 53 & 54 Viet., c.29.
52 (1925), 15 Geo. 5, c.23.
153 On the present law, see text, infra, at p.29.
54 (1938), 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c.45.
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The general principles of English matrimonial property law were taken
over in all the Canadian common law provinces. 5 Thus, Ontario has been
trailing English developments in this area ever since English civil law was
first introduced, as of October 15, 1792.56 The 1859 Act To Secure to Mar-
ried Women Certain Separate Rights of Property57 enabled a married woman
to hold, have and enjoy all her real and personal property as if she were un-
married, and empowered her to devise and bequeath her separate property to
her husband and children. The Married Women's Property Act, 1872,r3 pro-
tected the personal earnings of married women (section 2) and empowered
them, inter alia, to insure their own and their husband's lives (section 3), to
hold and vote stocks (section 5), and to make deposits in, and withdraw
them from, a bank (section 6). It was replaced by The Married Women's
Property Act, 1884,59 which was modelled on the English Married Women's
Property Act, 1882. It has remained the basic law of Ontario to this day.
Many of the reforms that were subsequently effected in England have
not, so far, been taken over in Ontario. Thus, the historical concept of the
wife's "separate property" has, in theory at least, been preserved. 60 Section 3
still provides that a married woman can contract "in respect of and to the ex-
tent of her separate property". 6 ' Section 7 precludes actions in tort between
husband and wife, except those necessary for the protection and security
of the wife's separate property. (For a tort committed against her by her
husband before the marriage, the wife may sue even for personal injuries62 ).
Dower and curtesy still exist,6s though the practical importance of dower is
very much diminished, while that of curtesy has dwindled to next to nothing.
55 See M. C. Cullity on "Property Rights during the Subsistence of the Marriage"
in I Studies at 179, and the "Baxter Report", Vol. 1, "Property Subjects" at 11-14.
56 The Property and Civil Rights Act, now R.S.O. 1970, c.367.
57 22 Vict. (Can.), c.34.
58 35 Vict. (Ont.), c.16.
59 47 Vict. (Ont.), c.79, now R.S.O. 1970, c.262.60 The Married Women's Property Act, 1884, s.2. In fact, a married woman in
Ontario has the same capacity in law as a man, see id., s.4.
11 Otherwise in Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, New Brunswick
and Newfoundland, which have abandoned the concept of a wife's separate property,
and provide in their respective Married Women's Acts that a married woman is capable
of acquiring, holding and disposing of any property in all respects as if she were un-
married. As early as 1924 Beck JA could say of Alberta that ".... in the state which our
legislation has reached there is now no such thing in this jurisdiction as the separate
estate of a married woman in the traditional and historical sense of that expression...",
Quinn v. Beales, [1924] 3 W.W.R. 337 at 344; [1924] 4 D.L.R. 635 at 641. See M.C.
Cullity, supra, note 55 at 183, n.10
6 2 German v. Whaley, [1971] 1 O.R. 745 (Ct. C.)
6 3 As to dower, see the Dower Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.114. It was first thought that
s.1 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1872 (supra) had abolished the husband's
tenancy by the curtesy, but it was held in Furness v. Mitchell (1879), 3 O.A.R. 510
that, while curtesy initiate was abolished by the Act, curtesy consummate was not. An
1877 amendment to the 1872 Act expressly preserved curtesy, but only as an interest
that a husband might have in his wife's land after her death intestate: R.S.O. 1877,
c.125, s.4. See the Baxter Report (Family Law Project of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission), Vol. I at 157-59.
1973]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
It is still possible to have restraints on anticipation,6 4 but they, too, are of
little importance in modern practice.
The Devolution of Estates Act65 and The Dependants' Relief Act 6 were
modelled on the corresponding English statutes, but here, too, some subse-
quent English amendments have not been incorporated in the laws of Ontario.
Pre-war development in the other common law provinces has pro-
ceeded along similar, though not identical, lines,67 but in Alberta, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and British Columbia dower and curtesy have been replaced by
homestead legislation on the American model. 68
IV THE POST WORLD WAR II ERA
The passion for law reform, which has gripped the Western World since
the end of the Second World War, has left no branch of the law untouched.
Yet in no area, with the possible exceptions of civil rights and consumer
protection, have demands for radical reform been more insistent or met with
such ready response, as in the law of husband and wife. It soon became clear
that in order to be acceptable to enlightened public opinion, a matrimonial
property system must meet two requirements: it must not reduce the wife
to a status in any way inferior to her husband's, but leave her with the in-
dependence which she enjoyed before marriage; 9 and it must establish, in
some way or other, an economic partnership between the spouses, with the
aim, primarily, of giving non-working wives a share in the acquests of their
husbands. A capitulare of Duke Adelchis of Lombardy of the ninth century
A.D., in providing that widows were to receive a share in the estates of their
husbands, stated that it was "inquitous and reprehensible" for husbands to
keep everything for themselves, without making adequate provision for their
wives.70 If this was true more than a thousand years ago, it is equally true
today. Despite the great increase in the number of working wives, the position
still is that most married women, having to devote themselves to husbands,
children and households, do not take on paid outside work, while those who
do earn, as a rule, substantially less than their husbands and have, in con-
64 The Married Women's Property Act, 1884, ss.4, 6, 10.
05 Now R.S.O. 1970, c.129.
GO Now R.S.O. 1970, c.126.
67 See supra, note 61.
08 See for Alberta, the Dower Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.1 14; for Manitoba, the Dower
Act, R.S.M. 1970, D-100; for Saskatchewan, the Homestead Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.118;
for British Columbia, the Homestead Act, R.S. 1960, c.175.
09 Unless marriage can be shown to blunt the intelligence or shake the emotional
stability of women, it is hardly arguable that a married woman, but not her unmarried
sister, must be protected from the "weakness of her sex" (cf. text, supra, at p.8). See
G. Baeteman in Kiralfy at 1. For a recent comparative study on the status of women
generally, see Ruth Ginsburg, ed., A Symposium on the Status of Women (1972), 20
Am. J. of Comp. Law 585, dealing with the position in Great Britain, Sweden, Norway,
France, the Soviet Union, Israel and Senegal.
70 See Schroeder und v. Kiinssberg, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, (7th ed. 1932)
at 346.
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sequence, no opportunities equal to those of their husbands to build up an
estate.
As the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, suc-
cinctly put it on an extra-judicial occasion:
The cock can feather the nest because he does not have to spend most of
his time sitting on it.71
Yet, "the wife's contribution to the joint undertaking in running the
home and looking after the children is just as valuable as that of the husband
in providing the home and supporting the family." 72
Equality (with its concomitant of mutual independence) and some form
of profit-sharing are the two essential requirements a matrimonial property
system must satisfy if it is to be in conformity with the ethos of our time.
Continental pre-war regimes generally fell short of the first, English law of
the second one. The problem was how to establish an economic partnership
between husband and wife without depriving the wife of full powers of
disposition over her own assets.
The response to the challenges of the post-World War II era in the
matrimonial property law area came in Germany with the Gesetz iiber die
Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau of June 18, 1957, and in France
with Loi No. 65-570 of July 13, 1965 (portant roforme des rdgimes matri-
monaux). In England, numerous important piecemeal reforms have taken
place, but a root-and-branch branch reform is still in the making. The 1971
Working Report of the Law Commission73 has laid the basis for it.
In Germany, the principle of the equality of the sexes was inscribed as
fundamental law in 1949. 74 The Gesetz fiber die Gleichberechtigung von
Mann und Frau of June 18, 1957, which came into force on June 30, 1958,
applied the principle of equality to husband and wife, and established
Zugewinngemeinschaft as the statutory regime, which takes place if the
spouses do not provide otherwise by antenuptial or postnuptial contract."
Zugewinngemeinschaft is a deferred community or participation system,
on the model of the Swedish legislation of 1920.76 In the German version the
spouses are, during the subsistence of the marriage, in the same position as
71 Quoted from Lord Hodson's statement in Pettitt's case, [1970] A.C. at 811.
72Quoted from the Royal Commission Report on Marriage and Divorce, Cmd.
9678, para. 644 at 175. See also M. C. Cullity, supra, note 55 at 271.
73 No. 42 (1971), discussed by Professor 0. Kahn-Freund in (1972), 35 M.L.R.
403. See further, text, infra at p.35.
74 On German law, see E.D. Graue in Kiral-y at 114.
75 BGB §1363.
76The Swedish system was taken over during the 1920ies by the other Scandinavian
countries. The idea of sharing on dissolution of the marriage is not a novel one. Some-
thing similar has existed for some time in Swiss and Hungarian law. In Austrian law a
"community on death" could be established by way of marriage settlement. See, espe-
cially, Karl H. Neumayer, Die Kombination von Vermeigenstrennung und Verma-
gensteilhabe im ehelichen Giiterrecht (1953), 18 Rabel Zeitschrift 376; also E. D. Graue,
supra, note 30 at 164-66.
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if they were separate as to property, but neither spouse may, without the
other's consent, dispose of his or her whole estate or of household goods.
77
On dissolution of the marriage (and in exceptional cases even during
marriage), the profits of the marriage are divided. The gains made by each
spouse.., are calculated by subtracting his initial estate from his final estate.
Inheritances and gifts received during the marriage are added to the initial
estate. The gains (if any) made by the spouses are then added up and equal-
ized by a compensatory payment. It is, in essence, a system of community
of profits, deferred until the dissolution of the marriage.
The spouse, who has made the greater gains, can refuse to make the
compensatory payment if it would, in the circumstances, be grossly inequitable
to ask him to do so, e.g. where the other spouse has persistently failed to
carry out the economic obligations flowing from the conjugal relationship.7 8
A feature peculiar to the German participation system is that in the
event of the dissolution of the marriage by death (still, despite the increase
in the divorce rate, by far the most frequent end to marriages) the surviving
spouse receives, in lieu of a compensatory payment, a quarter of the estate
of the first-dying, in addition to whatever he or she is entitled to as intestate
share or legitimate portion. Thus, where the first-dying spouse has died
intestate and there are children of the marriage, the widow or widower will
receive one-half of the estate - one-quarter in lieu of his or her share in the
Zugewinngemeinschaft and one-quarter as intestate portion. If there are no
children, but there are parents, or brothers or sisters, the surviving spouse
will receive three-quarters of the estate of the first-dying - one-quarter in
lieu of his share in the Gemeinschaft and one-half as intestate portion.79
This rule was adopted in order to avoid the need for detailed accounting on
death which, it was felt, might lead to family quarrels and create a lasting
rift between the surviving spouse and his or her children.
In France, Loi No. 65-570 of July 13, 1965, which came into force on
February 1, 1966, established the principle of the legal equality of the
spouses. 80 The wife has full legal capacity, 8' and can engage in any trade or
profession without requiring her husband's consent, 82 but neither spouse may,
without the other's consent, dispose of the family home or household
furniture.83
77BGB §§1365, 1369. See also §1367.
78BGB §1381.
70 BGB §1371.
80 On modem French matrimonial property law, see Professor A. Colomer in
Kiralfy at 80 ff. See further the report of the proceedings of the Soci6t6 de LUgislation
compar6, held in Paris on 17 and 18 March, 1972, on La riforme des regimes matri-
monjaux in France and Switzerland in (1972), 24 Revue Internationale de Droit
Compar6 449.
81 CN art. 216.
82 CN art. 222.
83 CN art. 215.
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The legal regime is a community of after-acquired property.84 Each
spouse retains the ownership and administration of the assets brought
into the marriage.8 5 Acquests, other than gifts and inheritances, are pooled
in a common estate, which unless the spouses agree to administer it jointly,
is administered by the husband.86 He cannot, however, without his wife's
consent, alienate or burden inmovables or a business forming part of the
common estate, or grant a lease of immovable property for commercial or
industrial use;87 nor can he, without his wife's consent, dispose of community
assets inter vivos by gratuitous title.88 He can, however, sell shares and other
securities.
The wife manages her separate property, including her own earnings,
wages and savings.89 She can no longer renounce the community but can,
in a proper case, sue for separation of goods.90 Alternatively, she can apply
to court for an order substituting herself in place of her husband as head of
the community.91 Unlike the rules of the old law, she can sue her husband
for damages for fraudulent acts even during the marriage.
A deferred community or participation system - rigime de participa-
tion aux acqu.ts - is offered to spouses as one of the conventional alter-
natives to the legal regime.92 The general principles are the same in the
German Zugewinngemeinschaft, but there are numerous differences in detail.
Most important, the German scheme of substituting in the case of the dis-
solution of the marriage by death one-quarter of the deceased's estate for
the surviving spouse's share in the community has not been adopted. In the
result, equalization of gains takes place irrespective of whether the marriage
is dissolved by divorce or by death.
The rights of succession ab intestato of the surviving spouse were clarified
and extended by Loi of 26 March 1957.93
84 CN art. 1401.
85 CN arts. 1403, 1428.
86 CN art. 1421.
87 CN art. 1424.
8 8 CN art. 1422. 0. Kahn-Freund in his article on Recent Legislation on Matri-
monial Property (1970), 33 M.L.R. 601 at 631, suggests that the new French community
is no community in the traditional sense at all, but a system of separation. He says
"It [matrimonial community of property] was also rejected in France (in fact if not
in name) when in 1965 the new wine of separation was poured into bottles bearing the
old label 'communauti, a cherished appellation controlte which Frenchmen did not
want to miss. In the classical country of matrimonial 'community' a true community of
goods can now exist only by virtue of a contractual arrangement."
89 CN arts. 224, 1425.
90 CN art. 1443.
91 CN art. 1426.
92 CN arts. 1569 et seq.
93 CN art. 767, as amended.
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In Quebec, the laws relating to the capacity of married women and
matrimonial property were reformed in 1964, and again in 1970.94 The 1964
reform established as a general principle that the legal capacity of married
women is not diminished by marriage. 95 Under the title of "Partnership of
Acquests" - socigtj d'acqu~ts8 - a deferred community of participation
system was established in 1970. The prohibition of donations between
spouses, formerly contained in arts. 770 and 1265 of the Quebec Civil Code,
was abolished, and so was the legal usufruct of the surviving consort in
community property, formerly contained in arts. 1323-1332.
The legal regime may be varied by marriage contract, entered into
before the marriage07 or, subject to certain safeguards, during the marriage.9 8
In England the last vestiges of the medieval order were swept away
after the war.90 The Married Women's (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act
1949, c. 78, abolished what little was left of restraints on anticipation. The
Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1962, c. 48, abrogated the rule that
spouses cannot sue each other in tort, subject to the proviso that the court
may stay such action if it appears that no substantial benefit would accrue
to either party from the continuation of the proceedings or that the question
in issue could be more conveniently dealt with under section 17 of the
Married Women's Property Act 1882. The wife's age-old agency of necessity
was abolished by section 41 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property
Act 1970, c. 45.
Thus, it is true to say that in English law, husband and wife are no
longer one, but emphatically two, separate as to property and economically
independent, except of course for duties of support. They retain the owner-
ship and control of their separate estates as if they were single, and can freely
contract with and sue each other. There remains some measure of discrimina-
tion in favour of the wife. If property or money of hers is put by her into
her husband's name, there is a rebuttable presumption that he was to hold
such property or money in trust for her, but if property or money to which
the husband is entitled is put by him into her name or into the joint names
of both spouses, a rebuttable presumption of advancement in favour of the
04See J.E.C. Brierley, supra, note 27 at 814.
05 J.E.C. Brierley, id., at 815.
06 CC arts. 1266c-1267d.
97 CC art. 1262.
08 CC art. 1265.
99 See A.K.R. Kiralfy in Kiralfy at 180. The shortcomings of English matrimonial
property law in the conditions of our time were discussed by Professor 0. Kahn-Freund
in a series of illuminating articles and monographs: Inconsistencies and Injustices in
the Law of Husband and Wife (1952), 15 M.L.R. 133; (1953), 16 M.L.R. 34 at 48;
Matrimonial Property: Some Recent Developments (1959), 22 M.L.R. 241; Recent
Legislation on Matrimonial Property (1970), 33 M.L.R. 601; Matrimonial Property Law
ed. by Friedman (Toronto: Carswell Co., 1955); Matrimonial Property: Where do we
go from here? (Joseph Unger Memorial Lecture, 1971).
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wife applies.100 Both presumptions have been considerably weakened by re-
cent judicial pronouncements in the House of Lords. 01'
While the married woman's emancipation has run its full course, prog-
ress towards participation has been piecemeal and hesitant. (This, of course,
is in the best common law tradition.) Realizing that, in modern conditions,
the needs of the surviving spouse are usually greater than those of the chil-
dren of the marriage, who are in the normal course of events self-supporting
by the time the marriage of their parents is terminated by the death of one
of them, the legislature has substantially improved the rights of the surviving
spouse on the death intestate of the first-dying spouse. Under section 46 of
the Administration of Estates Act 1925, c. 23, as amended by the Intestates
Estates Act 1952, c. 64, and the Family Provision Act 1966, c. 35, the sur-
viving spouse, in competition with children, takes the first £8,500 of the
estate of the deceased as a prelegacy. In competition with other heirs, the
amount to which he or she is entitled as a prelegacy is £30,000. In addi-
tion, the widow or widower takes all "personal chattels", including clothing,
jewellery, furniture, household goods, television sets and private cars. Nor
do the survivor's rights end here. If there is a residue and the deceased has
left issue, the widow or widower is entitled to a life interest in half the residue.
If there are no children, but there are parents, brothers or sisters of the
deceased, the surviving spouse takes half its capital value. Failing any of the
aforementioned relatives, the whole residue goes to the surviving spouse. A
widower or widow who has to share the inheritance with other heirs, may
demand that the matrimonial home be appropriated to his or her share.
There is still no legitimate portion or other fixed right of inheritance of
which the surviving spouse cannot be deprived, nor is there a participation
system of any kind, but the discretionary powers of the courts to award main-
tenance under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, c. 35, have been
greatly enlarged. Three major changes were made.10 2 First, whereas under
the original Act, the powers of the court were limited to cases where the
deceased had left a will, they were extended to cases of intestacy. Secondly,
100 See, e.g. Jones v. Maynard, [1951] 1 A.E.R. 802 (Ch); Tinker v. Tinker, [1970]
P.136, 1970 1 A.E.R. 540 (C.A.).
10 Pettitt v. Pettitt, [1970] A.C. 777 at 793, 811, 824; [1969] 2 A.E.R. 385 at 388,
389, 404, 414; Cf. Falconer v. Falconer, [1970] 3 A.E.R. 449 at 452; [1970] 1 W.L.R.
1333 at 1335 (C.A.). It is suggested, with all respect, that A.K.R Kiralfy (Comparative
Law of Matrimonial Property, ed. by A.K.R. Kiralfy (1972) at 206) goes too far when
he speaks of the presumption of advancement as being obsolete, see, e.g., Tinker v.
Tinker, [1970] P.136; [1970] 1 A.E.R. 540 (C.A.). The presumption was recently
applied in British Columbia in Greggain v. Greggain (1970), 73 W.W.R. 677 (B.C.),
where it was held that a heavy onus rests on a husband, who has conveyed real prop-
erty to his wife, to rebut the presumption of advancement. It used to be trite law that
the presumption cannot be rebutted by evidence that the husband conveyed the prop-
erty to his wife in order to defeat his creditors, but see now, contra, Szymczak v.
Szymczak, [1970] 3 O.R. 202 (Ont S.C.); 3 R.F.L. 253.
10 2 See the Intestates Estates Act, 1952, c.64, the Matrimonial Causes (Property
and Maintenance) Act, 1958, c.35, the Family Provision Act, 1966, c.35, the Matri-
monial Causes Act, 1965, c.72, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970,
c.33, and the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, c.45.
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the former restrictions on awards of maintenance by means of a lump sum,
as distinguished from periodic payments, were relaxed. And, thirdly, the
survivor of a void marriage, who had entered into the marriage in good faith,
was included among the "dependants" to whom maintenance may be awarded,
and so was a former spouse, including one whose marriage to the deceased
was annulled.
At common law savings made by the wife from her household allowance
belonged to the husband unless there was clear evidence that he had donated
them to her. 03 The Married Women's Property Act 1964, c. 19, prescribes
that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, each spouse is entitled
to an equal share of savings from a household or similar allowance, and
property acquired with such money.
As regards the matrimonial home, the common law rules, as settled in
National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth,10 4 were superseded by the Matri-
monial Homes Act 1967, c. 75, as amended by section 38 of the Matrimonial
Proceedings and Property Act 1970, c. 45. This Act applies where either
the husband or the wife is entitled to occupy a dwelling house by virtue of
any estate, interest, contract or enactment, and the other spouse is not so
entitled, and creates in favour of the second spouse a statutory right of oc-
cupation which, by registration of a charge, can be rendered effective against
any person deriving title from the first spouse. It does not, though, avail
against the trustee in bankruptcy of the first spouse.
Sections 1 and 2 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act
1970, c. 45, conferred on the courts discretionary powers, on a petition for
divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation, to order either spouse to
make provision for the maintenance of the other by periodic payments or
payment of a lump sum, both pending suit and after the decree has been
made. Section 4 of the same Act empowers the court to order that a spouse
shall transfer to the other spouse or to a child of the marriage property to
which the first-mentioned spouse is entitled, to order a settlement for the
benefit of the other spouse, or to vary or extinguish an antenuptial or
postnuptial settlement. Section 37 lays down that a spouse who has con-
tributed to the acquisition or improvement of property acquired by the other
spouse is entitled to such share in the beneficial interest in that property as
the court may determine.
While the legislature has thus gone some way towards bridging the
chasm of separateness, the courts in their turn have found the rules govern-
ing trusts and joint ventures useful tools to do justice between husband and
wife. In cases where both spouses were found to have contributed to the
purchase of a matrimonial home or a farm which was conveyed into the
103 On the unsatisfactory results of this rule, see Hoddinott v. Hoddinott, [1949]
2 K.B. 406 (C.A.) (Bucknill LJ and Cohen IJ, Denning LI diss.).
104 [19551 A.C. 1175 (H.L.).
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name of one spouse alone, they have readily inferred a resulting trust in
favour of the other spouse. Thus, where it was found that the wife had made,
directly or indirectly, substantial financial contributions to the purchase of a
house, which was conveyed into the husband's name, they have held that,
in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, the wife was entitled
to a beneficial interest in the house or its proceeds, proportionate to her con-
tributions. 0 5 Where a business had been built up over years by the joint
efforts of both spouses, they have held that the wife was entitled to a share
in the profits of the business and any property acquired with those profits.'0 6
On occasions, when it was clear that the wife had made a significant financial
contribution, but it was not possible to determine exactly how much, the
courts, relying on the old maxim that "equity leans towards equality", have
cut the Gordian Knot by holding that the division should be half and half. L07
There are limits to what the courts can do. If there was a trend to
establish ownership of the family home and family assets by judicial law-
making, it was stopped by the House of Lords in Pettitt v. Pettitt0 8 and
Gissing v. Gissing.10 9 And it must now be taken for settled that a trust will
not be inferred where the wife's or husband's financial contribution has been
minimal.n 0
The present position in England, then, is that the spouses are separate
as to property during the marriage, but that, on dissolution of the marriage
by divorce, the courts have far reaching discretionary powers to order the
payment of maintenance and a redistribution of property. Their powers on
105 Pettitt v. Pettitt, [1970] A.C. 777, [1969] 2 A.E.R. 385 (H.L.); Gissing v.
Gissing, [1970] 2 A.E.R. 780, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 255 (H.L.). See further Muetzel v.
Muetzel, [1970] 1 A.E.R. 443, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 188; Smith v. Baker, [1970] 2 A.E.R.
826, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1160 (C); Hargrave v. Newton, [1971] 3 A.E.R. 866, [1971] 1
W.L.R. 1611; Falconer v. Falconer, [1970] 3 A.E.R. 449, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1333; Davis
v. Vale [1971] 2 A.E.R. 1021, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1022. The same principles, incidentally,
have been applied to a couple living in concubinage, see, e.g., Cook v. Head, The
Times, 19 January 1972 (C.A.). It may not be without interest that on similar facts
the French court arrived at a similar result, on the ground that a socift6 de fait existed
between the man and his mistress, see, Arrgts de la Cour de Cassation, Chambres
Civiles, No. 1971 (no. 9) R302, 259.
106Nixon v. Nixon, [1969] 3 A.E.R. 1133 (C.A.), [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1676; In re
Cummins (dec'd), [1971] 3 A.E.IL 782 (C.A.). But see also Simon v. Simon (1971),
115 S.J. 673 (C.A.).
10 7 See Rimmer v. Rimmer, [1952] 2 A.E.R. 863 at 870; Smith v. Baker, [1970]
2 A.E.R. 826, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1160 (C.A.); Hargrave v. Newton, [1971] 3 A.E.R.
866, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1611.
108 [1970] A.C. 777, [1969] 2 A.E.R. 385 (H.L.).
109 [1970] 2 A.E.R. 780, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 255 (H.L.). This point was strongly
made by J. C. Hall in (1970), 28 C.LJ. 210, where he states that Pettitt and Gissing
"mark the ending of judicial attempts to introduce almost universal community of family
assets".
11o Pettitt v. Pettitt, supra, note 105; Gissing v. Gissing, supra, note 105; Simon v.
Simon, supra, note 106.
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dissolution of the marriage by death of one of the spouses are not equally
far-reaching. They may award maintenance out of the estate of the pre-
deceased spouse but have no powers to order a division of property.
The Canadian common law provinces have, by and large, continued to
follow in the footsteps of English law, though they have occasionally fallen
behind or moved ahead or away from it. They have faithfully continued to
resort to the presumptions of resulting trust and advancement. 1 In appro-
priate circumstances, they have decided that the wife was entitled to a bene-
ficial interest in the matrimonial home or her husband's business or farm,
but, following recent English judgments, they have held that in the absence
of a substantial financial contribution by the wife or an agreement that she
should acquire a joint interest in property acquired by the husband, the mere
facts of marriage and cohabitation did not entitle her to a proprietary share
either in the matrimonial home or household personalty. 11
Under sections 10 and 11 of the Divorce Act, RSC 1970, c. D-8, the
courts, on granting a divorce order, can make an order for the payment of
maintenance in favour of one of the spouses, but they have, unlike the Eng-
lish courts, no power to order a sale or transfer of property.113 By ordering
payment of maintenance in the form of a substantial lump sum payment, in
lieu of, or in addition to, periodic payments they have, however, occasionally,
achieved a redistribution of property.11 4
l See, e.g. Nemeth v. Nemeth (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 377 (B.C.); Greggain v.
Greggain (1970), 73 W.W.R. 677 (B.C.).
112 Klutz v. Klutz (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 332 (Sask.); Hunnings v. Hunnings
(1972) 7 R.L.F. 85 (B.C.). But see also Trueman v. Trueman, [1971] 2 W.W.R. 688
(Alta. A.D.), where the wife was held to be the beneficial owner of a half-share in a
farm, in view of her indirect contribution by working on the construction of the farm
house and on the cultivation and harvesting of the crops.
113Switzer v. Switzer (1970), 7 D.L.R. (3d) 638 (Alta. S.C.), 70 W.W.R. 161;
1. v. 1. (1970), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 760. See also Pugh v. Pugh (1971), 16 D.L.R. (3d)
318 at 325 (N.S. S.C.).
114 See, e.g., Boultbee v. Boultbee (1972), 4 R.F.L. 237 (B.C.); Omelance v.
Omelance and Bissinger (1972), 6 R.F.L. 196 (B.C.); Golightly v. Golightly and Homan
(1973), 9 R.F.L. 212 (Ont.); Chadderton v. Chadderton (1973), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 656
(Ont. C.A.).
The English Law Commission in its Working Report (No. 42 of 1971) recom-
mends that the power to make maintenance orders under the family provision legislation
should only be used for the purpose of providing support for a surviving spouse who is
in need, and not for the purpose of giving a spouse, who is not in need, a share in
"family assets" or property of the first-dying spouse. See text, infra, at pp.35, 36.
Under Quebec CC art. 208 the courts, on separation or divorce, may declare
gifts promised or executed under a marriage contract to be wholly or partially forfeited.
In British Columbia ss.8 and 9 of the Family Relations Act 1972 (B.C., c.20),
obviously inspired by s.4 of the English Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act
1970, c.45, empower the courts making an order for dissolution of marriage or judicial
separation, or declaring a marriage to be null and void, to order a redistribution of
property or vary an antenuptial or postauptial settlement.
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In contrast to the English courts, the powers of the Canadian courts to
make a maintenance order under the Divorce Act can only be exercised
"upon granting a decree nisi of divorce," 1 5 and not thereafter."16
In Ontario, perhaps the most conservative as well as the most prosper-
ous of the provinces, development in the matrimonial property area has been
slow. There is no legislation as yet dealing with rights in the matrimonial
home, with the result that issues, that were settled in England in National
Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth,1 7 continue to cause difficulties.11s Dower,
curtesy and restraints on anticipation, though little more than weak images
of their former selves, are still part of the law,"19 and so is the bar on tort
actions between husband and wife, except those necessary for the protection
of the wife's separate property. 20
The Ontario Dependants' Relief Act121 still fails to recognize a former
spouse of the deceased as a dependant to whom maintenance may be awarded,
and still does not allow for awards where the deceased departed this life
intestate.
The Family Relations Act 1972 of British Columbia 22 may serve as an
example of more up-to-date provincial legislation. Under section 8 the court,
on making an order of divorce or annulment, may order a division of prop-
erty, and under section 15 a former spouse of the deceased may be awarded
maintenance out of his or her estate, provided the marriage was dissolved
not more than two years before application was made.
V Vistas of the Future
German and French matrimonial property law, having been thoroughly
reformed in 1957 and 1965 respectively, are unlikely to undergo further
major changes in the foreseeable future. Whether the introduction of a
deferred community system, in Germany as the legal, 23 in France as an op-
tional regime, 124 has been a success is still an open question to which only
1 5 The Divorce Act, s.11(1).
116Lee v. Lee (1972), 7 R.F.L. 140 (B.C.). This was also the original position in
England, but was subsequently changed. See s.16(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
1965, c.72: "On granting a divorce or at any time thereafter...".
117 [1965] A.C. 1175, now superseded by the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, c.75,
see text, supra, at p. 30 .
118 See e.g., Carnochan v. Carnochan, [1953] O.R. 887, [1954] 1 D.L.R. 87, aff'd
[1954] O.W.N. 543, [1954] 4 O.L.R. 448, [1955] S.C.R. 669, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 81;
Korolev v. Korolev (1972), 7 R.F.L. 162 (B.C.). For a full discussion, see H.W. Silver-
man, The Deserted Wife's Dilemma (1970) 18 Chitty's Law Journal, 3 R.F.L. 235;
M.C. Cullity, supra, note 55 at 207-250.
"19 See text, supra, at p.20.
12 0 See text, supra, at p.20.
1
2 1 See text, supra, at p.21.
'
22 S.B.C. 1972, c.20.
123 See text, supra, at p.23.
124 See text, supra, at p.26.
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time can give the answer. 125 The same holds true of the Quebec partnership
of acquests.
In England it is generally recognized by now, that, in the words of
Professor 0. Kahn-Freund,120 "the problem of sharing between the spouses
and of the protection of the non-earning housewife (which is part of it), can
no longer be solved through the law of maintenance", but that a systematic
reform of matrimonial property law is required. The Law Commission, in
its deservedly well-received Working Report,1 27 considers the merits of sev-
eral possible solutions, singly or combined, and suggests, inter alia: the
adoption of a deferred community or participation system, on recent Con-
tinental models; joint ownership of the matrimonial home; and joint use and
enjoyment of household goods. Though it does not feel strongly in the matter,
it is not opposed to the idea of a legal right of inheritance of some kind or
other. It advocates a further extension of the discretionary powers of the
court under the family provision legislation, but stresses that these powers
should be exercised only for the purpose of making reasonable provision for
the maintenance of the spouse or a former spouse of the deceased, and not
for the purpose of giving a surviving spouse, who has no need for main-
tenance, a share in the "family assets". Finally, it proposes that the courts
should have the same powers to order a division of the property of the
spouses or a settlement which it at present has on divorce, on dissolution of
the marriage by death, or indeed at any time during the marriage.
Legitimate portion and family provision are not mutually exclusive. Both
have their advantages and disadvantages. The great advantage of a legitimate
portion is that the amount due to the surviving spouse can be ascertained by
a simple calculation, and that there is no need for him or her to go, hat-in-
hand, to court and ask for relief. As Edmond A. Bodkin remarks: 128
The decisions of the courts, both in this country and in the Dominions, show
that the consideration of the moral obligations attaching to the circumstances of
125 Professor 0. Kahn-Freund in (1970), 33 M.L.R. at 604, 605 remarks that
"the problem of matrimonial property has never been tackled systematically [in Eng-
land], the way it was tackled - with debatable success - in Germany in 1957 ... and
in France in 1965". [My italics]. It would seem that in Germany, where it was almost
unknown for spouses to contract out of the legal regime of the BGB prior to 1957
(see text supra, at note 37) many couples chose to contract out of Zugewinngemeinschaft.
As regards France, at a meeting of the Socigt6 de Legislation Comparg held in Paris
on 17 and 18 March, 1972, the question was put whether the regime of participation
aux acquats as a conventional system had encountered any difficulties in practice. Pro-
fessor Patarin, in reply, said that no full statistics were as yet available, and added:
"Le regime est parfois adopt6 par les futurs epoux, mais il semble que le notariat
francais se montre mrfiant h son 6gard", (1972), 24 Rev. Intern. de Droit Compar6
at 453.
126 (1970), 33 M.L.R. at 606.
127 No. 42 of 1971, discussed by Professor 0. Kahn-Freund in (1972), 35 M.L.R.
403, and by Mr. M. D.A. Freeman in (1972), 25 Current Legal Problems 84. Mr.
Freeman is convinced that English law is "moving inevitably towards community of
property". "Community spells justice, security and equality, all goals for which con-
temporary society strives." But see note 129a, below.
128 Testator's Family Maintenance (1941), 27 Journ. of Comp. Legislation and
International Law, 3rd series, Part I1, 155 at 162.
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the testator imposes a heavy burden on the judicature. The only alternative seems
to be for the legislators to take responsibility for giving the right to the spouse
and children to a definite proportion of the estate.
Giving the courts discretionary powers to order a division of property
on death, is subject to the same criticisms.
But the very fixity of the legitimate portion, which is its major ad-
vantage, is also its most serious disadvantage. It gives the same portion to the
poor and the rich widow (or widower), to a widow who has lived happily
with her late husband for a quarter of a century and the widow who was
married to him for a few months only or who had lived apart from him for
years. A fixed right of inheritance was the right solution as long as marriages
were reasonably stable. It does not go well with the divorce-prone unions of
our day.
Nor is a deferred community or participation system the answer to all
problems. Apart from the fact that it puts a premium on accurate book-
keeping between spouses, not exactly a practice to be encouraged, it does
not even ensure that the surviving spouse will always receive a fair share in
the estate of the predeceased spouse, no matter how rich the latter, and how
poor the former may be. Assuming the woman is the survivor, participa-
tion in acquests guarantees her participation in her husband's estate, where
he has become wealthy during the marriage by his own efforts. But where
his wealth was acquired before the marriage or inherited during the mar-
riage, there are no "acquests" in which she could share. Finally, and most
important, the best participation regime is not worth much, if most couples
contract out of it. In this respect, the German and French experience so far
has not been exactly encouraging, though it is perhaps too early to form a
judgment. 29
There is of course no reason why, in order to cover the ground fully, a
deferred community system should not be combined with a legal right of
inheritance, as well as with co-ownership of the matrimonial home, and why,
in addition, the courts should not have wide discretionary powers to award
maintenance and order a division of property either during the marriage or
on its dissolution by death or divorce, and it would appear that the Com-
mission would not be adverse to such a combination. One cannot help won-
dering, however, whether this would not amount to piling Ossa on Pelion, to
going from the former extreme of complete separation to the other extreme
of creating a surfeit of fixed and discretionary remedies which, at best, would
make the law complicated and, at worst, get into each other's way. Dis-
cretionary maintenance and property redistribution, with or without a deferred
community system, but without a legal right of inheritance or joint owner-
ship of the matrimonial home, would appear adequate to ensure equitable
solutions in all circumstances.
Whatever system Parliament at Westminster may finally decide to adopt,
it is now clear that, sooner or later, England will have a code of matrimonial
129 See supra, note 125.
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property law, bearing witness to the fact that it is not only in its accession
to the European Economic Community that Great Britain is moving closer
to the Continent. That such a code will have a profound impact on law-
makers in Canada cannot be doubted, but it by no means follows that its
solutions will be adopted in the Canadian common law provinces. The days
when Canada, Australia and other parts of the now defunct British Empire
slavishly followed the lead of Westminster are long past. Some years ago
Ontario was briefly flirting with the idea of a deferred community system,
but so far has not displayed much enthusiasm for it. It is not sure that there
would be a change in this respect even if such a regime were adopted in
England. The concept of a community regime, universal or partial, instant
or deferred, is alien to the common-law tradition19aa
Reforms which will, no doubt, be effected in the fullness of time in-
clude the abolition in those provinces where they still exist of fossils such
as dower, curtesy and restraints on anticipation, and of restrictions on the
capacity of spouses to sue each other in tort.
A major obstacle to the creation of a cohesive matrimonial property sys-
tem in Canada or any of her provinces, which is not encountered in unitary
England, is that "marriage and divorce" fall under federal jurisdiction, 130
while "property and civil rights" fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces. 131
129a In the light of developments subsequent to the time when this was written,
it now appears unlikely that a deferred or indeed any community regime will be adopted
in England.
130 B.N.A. Act s.91(26).
11 B.N.A. Act s.92(13).
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